Logic in the Lab by Verbrugge, Rineke
Logic in the Lab
Rineke Verbrugge
Institute of Artificial Intelligence
University of Groningen
P.O. Box 407
9700 AK Groningen,The Netherlands
L.C.Verbrugge@rug.nl
Categories and Subject Descriptors
F.4.1 [Mathematical Logic]: Modal Logic
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
higher-order social cognition, theory of mind, epistemic logic,
game theory, cognitive science
1. THEORY OF MIND
As humans, we live in a remarkably complex social envi-
ronment. One cognitive tool which helps us manage all this
complexity is our theory of mind, the ability to reason about
the mental states of others. By deducing what other peo-
ple want, feel and think, we can understand their actions,
predict how our actions will influence them, and decide how
we should behave to be successful. Theory of mind is the
cognitive capacity to understand and predict external be-
havior of others and oneself by attributing internal mental
states, such as knowledge, beliefs, and intentions [17]. This
is thought to be the pinnacle of social cognition. A heated
debate is going: Do very smart animals, such as chimpanzees
and ravens, have any theory of mind? [3, 19].
Especially important in intelligent interaction is higher-
order theory of mind, an agent’s ability to model recursively
mental states of other agents, including the other’s model of
the first agent’s mental state, and so forth. More precisely,
zero-order theory of mind concerns world facts, whereas
k+ 1-order reasoning models k-order reasoning of the other
agent or oneself. For example, “Bob knows that Alice knows
that he wrote a novel under pseudonym” (KBobKAlicep) is
a second-order attribution. It is commonly accepted that
animals other than human beings do not use second- and
higher-order theory of mind.
Several formal theories well-known to the TARK audi-
ence are suited to represent higher-order theory of mind
in intelligent interaction, for example, epistemic logic, dy-
namic epistemic logic, and epistemic game theory [15, 6,
22, 16]. However, in epistemic logic, unlimited rationality
is usually taken for granted. Agents are assumed to be log-
ically omniscient: they know all logical truths. The epis-
temic language allows reasoning on any modal depth and
presupposes that agents can immediately decide whether a
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formula like KAnn¬KBobKAnnKCarol¬KAnn wAnn is true in
a given possible world. This is clearly not the case for all
people [23]. Similarly, people often do not act according
to the game-theoretic assumption of common knowledge of
rationality [4]. In particular, several researchers have found
that both children and adults have difficulties when applying
second-order theory of mind in game situations [10, 7]. But
how do people really reason about others’ mental states?
2. EXPERIMENTS
In our lab, we have performed several experiments with
subjects applying second-order theory of mind in simple dy-
namic games. It turned out that we could facilitate their
correct and fast performance a lot, for example, by provid-
ing step-wise training, by introducing a visual presentation
that is easy to understand, and by prompting subjects to
think about what their opponent would do [12, 13]. With
the help of these cues, the subjects made the best possible
decision in more than 90% of the game items. From what
the subjects told us, however, we got the impression that
even if they made the correct decisions, they did not rea-
son exactly according to the game theory textbook. By a
follow-up experiment with an eye-tracker, we concluded that
indeed, most experimental subjects did not apply backward
induction from the start, but tried to get by with forward
reasoning as much as possible [14].
Formal methods are very useful for designing experiments
and interpreting the results. As an example, Stenning and
Van Lambalgen [18] provide an interesting analysis of the
difficulties that autistic children have in ascribing false be-
liefs to another person, if they themselves know the true
facts. As another example, one can investigate the com-
putational complexity of the tasks that experimental sub-
jects have been set [11]. Currently, we are investigating the
complexity of several instances of backward induction and
comparing them with subjects’ behavior in terms of reaction
times, decisions, and eye movements.
3. COGNITIVE MODELS
In order to understand how people really reason and solve
problems, it has proven fruitful in cognitive psychology to
use computational cognitive models implemented in a cogni-
tive architecture such as ACT-R, which has been validated
in hundreds of experiments [1]. It is also possible to use such
computational models when investigating how people reason
about other people’s knowledge, beliefs and plans. One way
to do this is to make an ACT-R model in which different rea-
soning strategies, such as backward reasoning and forward
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reasoning, ‘compete’ with one another and the model learns
by experience which reasoning strategy efficiently provides
effective decisions [9, 8]. The main advantage of using com-
putational cognitive models is that one can formulate very
precise predictions and see whether the simulations match
results of new experiments in the lab.
This is just what we did in the case of the controversy
about smart birds: Elske van der Vaart constructed a com-
putational cognitive model of birds’ smart social behavior.
It turned out that this ‘virtual bird’, equipped with sophis-
ticated memory based on the theory behind ACT-R [2], and
reacting to the stress of being observed, performed similarly
to the real birds in several experiments [20, 21]. In the lit-
erature, the birds’ behavior is often thought to exemplify a
form of perspective-taking: “I want to prevent that the other
bird knows where I’ve hidden my worms” [5]. We made some
precise predictions that can help settle the disputes between
‘theory of mind’ versus ‘simple behavioral rules’, and that
are currently being investigated in the lab.
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